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COMMENTS
THE FERES BAR: THE RIGHT RULING FOR THE WRONG
REASON
I. INTRODUCTION
Many courts throughout the country have forgotten that the Feres
bar, a doctrine prohibiting service members from recovering for any
injury that occurred incident to military service,1 serves a valid fiscal
function. Service members are entitled to statutory compensation sys-
tems which resemble private workers' compensation schemes. There-
fore, they should not be eligible to recover further under the Federal
Tort Claims Act (FTCA). The original purpose of the FTCA was to
waive sovereign immunity and make the government answerable to cit-
izens who were without a remedy, rather than to make additional provi-
sion for those already provided for.2 Service members should not be
permitted to recover monetary damages when their loss has already
been remedied.
This fiscal function rationale for the Feres doctrine has been cast
aside and courts today rely on the military discipline rationale,3 based
on a deferential theory that courts should not interfere with military
matters. The military discipline rationale faces serious resistance in
the lower courts because many of the suits involving service members
do not directly impact the relationship with the chain of command or
sensitive military matters. Judges have found it increasingly difficult
to justify barring claims based on a military discipline rationale that
1. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950).
2. Id. at 140.
3. United States v. Shearer, 473 U.S. 52, 58 n.4 (1985) (characterizing the
geographic uniformity and alternative benefits rationales as "no longer controlling").
In Shearer, the court emphasized: "Although the Court in Feres based its decision on
several grounds . . . Feres seems best explained by the 'peculiar and special
relationship of the soldiers to his superiors, the effects of the maintenance of such
suits on discipline, and the extreme results that might obtain if suits under the Tort
Claims Act were allowed for negligent orders given or negligent acts committed in the
course of military duty."' Id. at 57.
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seems unfair when the justification for the bar does not fit the facts of
particular cases.4 As a result, the courts have looked for ways around
the Feres bar by distinguishing minor facts from case precedents.
Recent cases have permitted soldiers to recover for carbon monox-
ide poisoning in government housing5 because the incidents occurred
on the weekend. In the original Feres case, government negligence
resulted in a soldier's death in a barracks fire during the duty week.6 A
judge in one jurisdiction stretched to make factual distinctions that
allowed a newborn baby to recover for wrongful life, but barred the
mother's claim for wrongful birth because the mother received negli-
gent prenatal care while on active duty. 7 In another case, a court reluc-
tantly followed the Feres doctrine when civilians rafting in a military
recreational boat could recover for the government's negligence, but
sailors sitting beside them could not.'
When courts fail to find the military discipline rationale as a con-
vincing reason for their rulings upholding the Feres bar, they blatantly
state that they are forced to follow Supreme Court precedent and beg
for Congressional reform to the Federal Tort Claims Act.9 The Feres
Bar does not need to be fixed, but the doctrine's rationale does.
Courts have stretched the military discipline rationale too far. If
courts focus more on the financial reasons for the doctrine it would
become evident that both the interests of service members as well as
taxpayers are adequately being served by the Feres doctrine in place.
The Feres bar provides a significant fiscal function by capping the
amount of recovery for service members similar to private organiza-
tions' efforts to limit liability through workers' compensation schemes.
Courts should conduct an informed comparison that reviews the
claimant's requested amount for damages versus the military benefits
the service member will receive. If a court finds medical, disability
4. Richards v. United States, 176 F.3d 652 (3d Cir. 1999).
5. Hall v. United States, 130 F. Supp 2d. 825 (S.D. Miss. 2000) (finding that when
a Naval petty officer died and four children from carbon monoxide poisoning in
government quarters, the claim was not barred because it occurred on a weekend). See
also, Elliot By and Through Elliot v. United States, 13 F.3d 1555 (11th Cir. 1994)
(concluding when a serviceman suffered injuries from carbon monoxide poisoning
while watching TV in government housing is not incident to service because the
soldier was on leave status), reh'g granted and opinion vacated, 28 F.3d 1076 (11th Cir.
1994), on reh'g, 37 F.3d 617 (11th Cir. 1994).
6. Feres, 340 U.S. at 135 (establishing that the United States was not liable under
the FTCA for the death of a serviceman by fire in the barracks while on active duty).
7. Smith v. Saraf, 148 F. Supp.2d 504 (D.NJ. 2001).
8. Costo v. United States, 248 F.3d 863 (9th Cir. 2001).
9. Id.
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and veterans' benefits inadequate, it can recommend congressional
reform to the statutory compensatory measures already in place rather
than attacking the government's valid Feres bar defense.
II. WHAT IS THE FERES DOCTRINE?
In 1950, the Supreme Court created an exception to the Federal
Tort Claims Act (FTCA) called the Feres doctrine, which bars service
members from recovering for activities incident to service.'0 Essen-
tially, this doctrine provides that military personnel cannot sue the
government for personal injuries suffered while performing their
duties or when utilizing a privilege entitled to service members.
Throughout the last fifty years, courts have questioned the logic and
expansion of this doctrine." In order to understand the controversy, it
is important to understand the congressional and judicial background
of service members' rights to recover.
In 1946, Congress passed the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA)
which permits citizens to file lawsuits against the United States for loss
of property, personal injury, or death caused by the tortious conduct
of a government employee who acted within the scope of his/her
employment.' 2 This allows recovery against the government in cir-
cumstances where the United States would be liable if the government
was a private person in accordance with the law of the place where the
act or omission occurred. 13 Several exceptions to the FTCA limit the
United States' liability, including 28 U.S.C. §2680(j). This exception
provides governmental immunity from service members' lawsuits
"arising out of the combatant activity of the military or naval forces, or
the Coast Guard, during time of war."' 4 The FTCA "contains no
express provision barring claims of military personnel during
peacetime."'
15
In Feres v. United States, the Supreme Court created a peacetime
exception by barring recovery when military personnel suffer injuries
10. Feres, 340 U.S. at 135.
11. United States v. Johnson, 481 U.S. 681 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Costo v.
United States, 248 F.3d 863 (9th Cir. 2001); O'Neill v. United States, 140 F.3d 564 (3d
Cir. 1998).
12. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) (2001).
13. 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (2001).
14. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(j) (2001).
15. Elliot By and Through Elliot v. United States, 13 F.3d 1555, 1558 (11th Cir.
1994), reh'g granted and opinion vacated, 28 F.3d 1076 (11th Cir. 1994), on reh'g, 37
F.3d 617 (11th Cir. 1994).
20011
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arising from activities incident to their military service. 16 The Court
sent a message supporting sovereign immunity for military matters
when it stated: "We know of no American law which ever has permit-
ted a soldier to recover for negligence, against either his superior
officers or the Government he is serving."'17 The Court concluded by
saying:
We do not think that Congress, in drafting this [Federal Tort Claims]
Act, created a new cause of action dependent on local law for service-
connected injuries or death due to negligence. We cannot impute to
Congress such a radical departure from established law in the absence
of express congressional command. 8
The Feres case then established the rule of law "that the Government is
not liable under the Federal Tort Claims Act for injuries to servicemen
where the injuries arise out of or are in the course of activity incident
to service.' 9
The reference to "incident to service" originated in Brooks v.
United States.2 ° There, a United States Army truck negligently struck
two servicemen while they were traveling on a public highway in their
privately owned vehicle while they were on furlough.2' The Court cau-
tiously applied the Federal Tort Claims Act to the Brooks case in 1949,
declaring that servicemen could recover against the United States
under the FTCA for injuries that were not sustained "incident to their
military service. '"22
One year later, the Supreme Court granted certiorari and com-
bined three servicemen's lawsuits against the United States into Feres
v. United States, which established the Court's initial standard for bar-
ring incident to service claims.23 In Feres' suit, the executrix of a ser-
viceman brought an action for her deceased husband who died in a
fire while sleeping in military barracks.2 4 The suit alleged negligence
for quartering him in barracks known to be unsafe and failure to main-
tain an adequate fire watch.25 In Jefferson's suit, the soldier received
16. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950). See also, United States v.Johnson,
481 U.S. 681 (1987); United States v. Shearer, 473 U.S. 52 (1985).
17. Feres, 340 U.S. at 141.
18. Id. at 146.
19. Id.
20. Brooks v. United States, 337 U.S. 49 (1949).
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Feres, 340 U.S. at 135 (combining Feres', Jefferson's and Griggs' claims into
one case).
24. Id. at 137.
25. Id.
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an abdominal operation while serving active duty in the Army. 26 Eight
months later during another operation, a U.S. Army towel was discov-
ered in his stomach.27 The complaint alleged that an Army surgeon
negligently left the towel there.28 In Griggs' case, an executrix alleged
that the negligent and unskillful medical treatment utilized by Army
surgeons caused her husband's death while he was on active duty.2 9
By barring all three cases where each claimant, on active duty and not
on furlough, sustained injury due to the negligence of others in the
Armed Forces, the Supreme Court created the Feres doctrine.30
In United States v. Johnson, the Supreme Court summarized the
three distinct rationales mentioned in the 1950 Feres opinion:
First, the distinctively federal character of the relationship between the
Government and Armed Forces personnel necessitates a federal rem-
edy that provides simple, certain, and uniform compensation, unaf-
fected by the fortuity of the situs of the alleged negligence. Second, the
statutory veterans' disability and death benefits system provides the
sole remedy for service-connected injuries. Third, even if military neg-
ligence is not specifically alleged in a service member's FTCA suit, mil-
itary discipline may be impermissibly affected by the suit since the
judgments and decisions underlying the military mission are necessa-
rily implicated, and the duty and loyalty that service members owe to
their services and country may be undermined.3 1
In 1954, the Supreme Court began to focus on the military disci-
pline rationale in Brown v. United States.32 The Court emphasized
those unique relationships and missions of the military that require
the Court's deference. 33 The "peculiar and special relationship of sol-
dier to superiors, the effects of service member suits on discipline, and
the extreme results that might obtain if suits under the FTCA were
allowed for negligent orders given or negligent acts committed in the
course of military duty" all support the rationale of the Feres doctrine,
that the courts should not interfere with claims that were incident to
service.3 4 While courts today continue to note the other original rea-
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. United States v. Johnson, 481 U.S. 681, 681-82 (1987).
32. Brown v. United States, 348 U.S. 110 (1954) (distinguishing the injury in a
veterans' hospital did not occur when the respondent was on active duty or subject to
military discipline from the facts in the Feres case).
33. Id.
34. Id. at 112.
2001]
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sons for the Feres bar, they do not give them much consideration
because the other two rationales do not help determine whether the
accident was incident to service. Therefore, the military discipline
rational has become the primary justification for the Feres doctrine.35
The doctrine's military discipline rationale led to expansion of the
types of claims that have been barred. The Stencel case arose out of a
National Guard fighter aircraft malfunction.36 When the plaintiff sued
the manufacturer and the United States for joint negligence, the court
denied the third party indemnity action against the United States. 37
Recovery was unavailable for the same reasons that the service mem-
ber could not sue the government himself-the claim would require
interference with military affairs and the direct action by the service
member would be barred under Feres.38 This case broadened the gov-
ernment's immunity and prevents recovery indirectly where it would
be prohibited directly.
In 1983, the court adopted the "Genesis Test."'39 In Hinkie v.
United States, a widow brought suit for herself and her two children
who suffered from birth defects as a result of the father's alleged expo-
sure to radioactive materials while he was on active duty in the U.S.
Army.4 ° The Feres doctrine prevented the father's recovery because the
injury was caused incident to service and would cause investigation
that would lead to interference with military discipline and decision
making.4 1 In this case, the Third Circuit extended the bar to derivative
claims-when the injury to a civilian has its 'genesis' in the injury suf-
fered by the military personnel incident to service.42
A wide range of appellate cases involving service members con-
sistently applied the Feres bar based primarily on the military disci-
pline rationale, while many lower courts have struggled with that
reasoning. Even though the other two rationales applied by the
Supreme Court in the Feres decision (the distinctive federal relation-
ship rationale and the presence of an alternative source of compensa-
tion system rationale) "regularly appear when Feres issues arise, they
have lost much of their vitality, and provide no help in determining
35. United States v. Shearer, 473 U.S. 52, 58 n.4 (1985).
36. Stencel Aero Eng'g v. United States, 431 U.S. 666 (1977).
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Hinkie v. United States, 715 F.2d 96 (3d Cir. 1983). See also, Mondelli v.
United States, 711 F.2d 567 (3d Cir. 1983).
40. Hinkie v. United States, 715 F.2d 96 (3d Cir. 1983).
41. Id.
42. Id.
[Vol. 24:71
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when an injury occurs 'incident to service.' ''43 As a result, when
courts try to figure out if the claimant should be barred because he/
she was acting incident to service, they focus on the effect of the law-
suit on the military disciplinary structure. 44 Determining if an acci-
dent is incident to service is critical because if the claimant proves the
accident was not related to his/her military service, then the service
member can recover under the FTCA just as any other citizen.45 Due
to the fact the three original policy rationales created by the Feres
Court face serious criticism, many circuit courts have developed four
factors to better define "incident to service. '"46 This factor-based
approach allows those courts to get around the Feres bar when they
find the military discipline rationale fails to support the facts in the
case before them.
III. THE "INCIDENT TO SERVICE" LOOPHOLE
The Feres doctrine only bars those suits against the Government
for injuries that "arise out of or in the course of activity incident to
service." 47 Deciding whether an injury is incident to military service
is not a simple task because there is no bright line between whether an
injury was or was not incident to the claimant's military service. 48 The
inquiry is fact specific and not easily susceptible to clear rules.49
Courts primarily look to four factors in determining whether the
situation occurred "incident to service": (1) situs of injury; (2) nature
of the plaintiffs activities at the time of the incident; (3) the duty sta-
tus of the plaintiff at the time of the incident; and (4) the benefits
accruing to the service member.50 None of these factors are disposi-
tive. 51 Courts focus on the "totality of the circumstances" and com-
pare fact patterns to other cases applying the doctrine.52 Courts have
successfully sidestepped the Feres bar by distinguishing minor facts
and deciding events do not qualify as incident to service.
43. Elliot, 13 F.3d at 1559.
44. Id.
45. Brown v. United States, 348 U.S. 110 (1954).
46. Costo, 248 F.3d at 867.
47. Feres, 340 U.S. at 146.
48. "The Feres doctrine cannot be reduced to a few bright-line rules; each case
must be examined in light of the statute as it has been construed in Feres and
subsequent cases." United States v. Shearer, 473 U.S. 52, 57 (1985).
49. Id.
50. Costo, 248 F.3d at 867.
51. Id.
52. Id.
2001]
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Precedents that have applied the Feres doctrine prove that the
analysis is largely fact-driven.53 The pattern over the last fifty years
indicates certain injuries are routinely barred as incident to service
claims. This list includes personal injury or death arising from: negli-
gent maintenance of government quarters,54 accidents while utilizing
government recreational equipment, 55 medical malpractice claims ,56
radiation or exposure to chemicals, 57 sexual harassment, 58 and racial
discrimination.5 9 In these cases damage would not have occurred but
for the service member's military status. 60
Most courts consistently apply the Feres bar based on the military
discipline rationale, but some judges who feel the case would not
require examination of military decisions find exceptions to the rule
with the incident to service factors. For instance, courts recognize that
medical care is a military benefit and therefore medical malpractice
cases are Feres barred. 6 1 However, some courts question whether the
relationship between the doctor and patient affect military discipline 62
or whether the Feres bar extends to all benefits incident to military
63service. Courts have often found ways to bend the rules to avoid
application of the Feres bar.
IV. How COURTS BEND THE RULES TO GET AROUND THE FERES BAR
Many courts are reluctant to impose the Feres doctrine and want
to take advantage of every opportunity to avoid the government's bar.
53. Id.
54. Feres, 340 U.S. at 135.
55. Costo, 248 F.3d at 863; Pringle v. United States, 208 F.3d 1220 (10th Cir.
2000).
56. Feres, 340 U.S. at 135; Atkinson v. United States, 485 U.S. 987 (1988); Persons
v. United States, 925 F.2d 292 (9th Cir. 1991); Del Rio v. United States, 833 F.2d 282
(11th Cir. 1987).
57. Minns v. United States, 155 F.3d 445 (4th Cir. 1998).
58. Mackey v. United States, 226 F.3d 773 (6th Cir. 2000); Morse v. West, 975 F.
Supp. 1379 (D. Colo. 1997).
59. Speigner v. Alexander, 248 F.3d 1292 (11th Cir. 2001).
60. Elliot, 13 F.3d at 1162 (11th Cir. 1994).
61. Smith v. Saraf, 148 F. Supp.2d 504, 514 (D.NJ. 2001) ("any injury experienced
by an active duty service member as a result of treatment paid for or provided by the
military is inherently "incident to service", even if the injury itself is unrelated to the
service.").
62. Id. at 519.
63. Elliot, 13 F.3d at 1563 (refusing to apply the Feres bar to all military benefits
and concluding that providing safe government housing does not involve "sensitive
military issues" or the second-guessing of military orders so the Feres bar does not
apply).
[Vol. 24:71
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In Hansen v. United States, the plaintiff suffered injuries while shop-
ping at a commissary and the district court dismissed the suit due to
lack of jurisdiction. 64 The decision was reversed on appeal to allow for
discovery in order to show the Feres doctrine should not apply.65 As a
general rule, "where pertinent facts bearing on the question of jurisdic-
tion are in dispute, discovery should be allowed. '66 The Hansen court
stated:
If the discovery sought by the Hansens could conceivably have demon-
strated that their suit is not barred by the Feres doctrine, then the suit
should not have been dismissed before that discovery was complete. It
is at least conceivable that the requested discovery would establish
facts under which the Hansens would elude the Feres doctrine.
Although the Feres doctrine has a broad reach, the discovery sought by
the Hansens might establish that Feres does not bar their suit.67
The Ninth Circuit ruled that the Feres doctrine should not be applied
prematurely, and it also sent a message that it was willing to entertain
ideas that shopping at a commissary may not be "incident to service"
because the military relationship could be too tenuous. 68
Courts have also found ways to get around the service member's
bar to recovery in medical malpractice cases involving negligent prena-
tal care. In Smith v. Saraf, the plaintiffs, Yvonne and Willie Smith,
brought a medical malpractice suit against Dr. Saraf on behalf of them-
selves and their son, Elijah Smith.69 Plaintiffs alleged that as a result of
Dr. Saraf's negligence in failing to ensure that Mrs. Smith received par-
ticular prenatal tests, the plaintiffs were prevented from discovering
that Elijah would be born with a severe birth defect, and the Smiths
were thereby deprived of the choice to terminate the pregnancy.70 Mrs.
Smith was a service member on active duty status with the Air Force at
the time of the alleged medical practice and the government paid for
64. Hansen v. United States, 248 F.3d 1171 (9th Cir. 2001) (The Feres doctrine
relates to sovereign immunity and even though it is used an affirmative defense, it is
treated as a bar to jurisdiction).
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. (the "Hansens' interrogatories would illuminate the nature of the agreement
between McChord [Air Force Base] and the commissary, as well as the operations of
the commissary, and might demonstrate that the commissary was so far removed from
the military command-in terms of military regulations, staffing, funding, and
management-that the act of shopping in the commissary is not "incident to service.").
69. Smith v. Saraf, 148 F. Supp.2d 504 (D.NJ. 2001).
70. Id.
20011
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her prenatal care. 71 As a result, Mr. and Mrs. Smith's claim for wrong-
ful birth were barred by the Feres doctrine, but Elijah's claim for
wrongful life was permitted.72
Smith classifies the fetus as a civilian under the Feres doctrine
who is entitled to recover damages for wrongful life under the Federal
Tort Claims Act.73 Even though the wrongful life claim derived from
the negligent prenatal care to the mother, the court granted recovery to
the child.7 ' This court inadvertently established a direct duty between
the doctor and the fetus, 75 which enabled the court to distinguish its
ruling from the well-established genesis theory. A definition of genesis
theory is found in the case Minns v. United States: "If a non-service-
man's injury finds its 'genesis' in the injury suffered by a serviceman
incident to [military] service, then the Feres doctrine bars the non-
serviceman's suit."76 The courts consistently bar claims where babies
are born with deformities caused by military acts or negligence such
as overexposure to radiation or chemicals. 77 Smith v. Saraf illustrates
the growing trend away from the genesis theory and reveals that
"[c]ourts have been hesitant to [Feres] bar claims involving minor
children."
78
In Hall v. United States, the court permitted recovery for the sur-
viving wife of Michael Shawn Johnston, a service member, who died of
carbon monoxide poisoning while asleep in on-post housing provided
by the government.79 The district court concluded that the service
member, who was off-duty for the weekend at the time of his death,
was not injured during the course of activity incident to his service, so
the Feres doctrine did not bar recovery.80 The opinion clearly outlined
the three rationales that support the Feres doctrine and the factors in
determining its applicability, including the totality of the circum-
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 519.
76. Minns v. United States, 155 F.3d 445, 449 (4th Cir. 1998) (holding Feres bar
applies to wife and children who suffered when the child was born with birth defects
that were allegedly caused by inoculations and exposure to toxins and pesticides
administered by military to servicemen in anticipation of possible chemical attacks
during the Persian Gulf War).
77. Id.
78. Mack v. United States, No. 00-2296, 2001 WL 179888, at *5 (D. Md. Feb. 21,
2001).
79. Hall v. United States, 130 F. Supp.2d 825, 826 (S.D.Miss. 2000).
80. Id at 829.
[Vol. 24:71
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stances, but came up with a result opposite to that reached in the origi-
nal Feres case."'
The court emphasized the duty status as the most important fac-
tor and went on to explain that there are 'degrees of active service.'
8 2
The court outlined a spectrum of duty status. At one end of the spec-
trum is an active duty service member performing duties within the
scope of employment, which is clearly conduct incident to service. On
the other end of the spectrum is an individual who has been dis-
charged and therefore has civilian status.8 3 "Between these extremes
are degrees of active duty status ranging from furlough or leave to mere
release from the day's chores. 8 4 The judge compared the facts in
Feres8 5 and Elliot86 to this case because in all three cases, active duty
servicemen were injured at their on base housing quarters, allegedly
because of negligent maintenance by military personnel.8 7 The court
managed to distinguish this case because the injury occurred on a
Sunday, while Johnston was off duty for the weekend."" In Feres the
injured serviceman was off duty for the night, and in Elliot the service-
man's injury occurred while he was on two-week leave status.8 9
After laboring over this minor distinction in the day of the week,
the court sided with Kelly v. Panama Canal Commission,90 and held
that if the injury occurs on a weekend, then a serviceman's duty status
is not a strong indicator of whether he was acting incident to service. 9'
The Kelly court found that in the specific case of a serviceman whose
work week was Monday to Friday and who was injured in an accident
that occurred when he was off-duty for the weekend, "his duty status
[fell] along the middle of the spectrum and [was] not a strong indicator
of whether he was acting incident to service."92
The court in the Hall case then went on to focus on the fact that
an on-post injury does not immediately trigger the application of
Feres .93 "If the injury occurred on the base, the Court must proceed to
81. Id.
82. Id. at 827 (quoting Parker v. United States, 611 F.2d 1007 (5th Cir. 1980).
83. Id. at 827.
84. Id.
85. Feres, 340 U.S. at 135.
86. Elliot, 13 F.3d at 1555 (11th Cir. 1994).
87. Hall v. United States, 130 F. Supp.2d 825 (S.D.Miss. 2000).
88. Id. at 829.
89. Id.
90. Kelly v. Panama Canal Comm'n, 26 F.3d 597 (5th Cir. 1994).
91. Id. at 600.
92. Id.
93. Hall v. United States, 130 F. Supp.2d 825 (S.D.Miss. 2000).
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the further inquiry of what function the soldier was performing at the
time of the injury in order to ascertain the totality of the circum-
stances."94 The Hall opinion stated that even though "the injury at
issue occurred while Johnston was on base, the court ultimately [was]
not persuaded under the 'totality of the circumstances' that it occurred
incident to his military service. At the time of his injury, Johnston was
asleep while off duty for the weekend, a purely personal activity. 95
The only difference between this case and the original ruling in Feres96
appears to be the day of the week because both service members were
off duty, engaged in the 'purely personal activity' of sleeping!
This case demonstrates a court's ability to take advantage of the
fact the Feres doctrine is not governed by bright-line rules9 7 and the
incident to service factors can be manipulated to permit recovery
when the court feels sympathy for claimants. While the tragic events
warrant compensation, the court should have considered the fact tax-
payers are going to pay for the statutory entitlements for the service
member in addition to the award granted in trial.
V. IS IT TIME FOR THE SUPREME COURT OR CONGRESS TO STEP IN?
In the past, when the United States Supreme Court discovered
inconsistent rulings throughout the circuits, it stepped in to restate its
unchanged position supporting the Feres Bar. After a series of contra-
dictory rulings, in the 1985 case United States v. Shearer, the Supreme
Court clarified that "[u]nder the Feres doctrine, situs of injury to a
serviceman is not nearly as important as whether a Federal Tort
Claims Act suit requires a civilian court to second-guess military deci-
sions and whether the suit might impair essential military disci-
pline."9 In the 1987 case, United States v. Johnson the Court held that
the Feres doctrine bars Federal Tort Claims Act action on behalf of
94. Id. at 828.
95. Id. at 829.
96. Feres, 340 U.S. at 135.
97. Id. at 828.
98. United States v. Shearer, 473 U.S. 52 (1985) (barring recovery of survivor of a
serviceman "who was murdered by fellow serviceman off base and off duty where
basis of liability was that military superiors negligently and carelessly failed to assert
sufficient control over the offending serviceman, who had previously been convicted
of murder, failed to warn others that he was at large and negligently and carelessly
failed to remove such serviceman from active military duty; plaintiff could not escape
the Feres net by focusing only on the case with a claim of negligence and by
characterizing the claim as a challenge to a "straightforward personnel decision,"
because by whatever name it was called, the claim called into question a decision of
command").
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service member killed during activity incident to service, even if
alleged negligence is by civilian employee of federal government.9 9 In
both of these cases, the majority ruled that the government will not be
liable for its actions and re-emphasized the military discipline
rationale.100
In response to the majority opinion in the Johnson case, Justice
Scalia attacked the Feres doctrine and its rationale in his dissent. He
felt the original Feres case was wrongly decided and that no rationale
justifies the result. 101 He noted the parallel private liability rationale
had been rejected in earlier cases.'0 2 He criticized the 'distinctively
federal relationship' rationale promoting the military's need for uni-
formity is no longer controlling and feels that "nonuniform recovery
cannot possibly be worse than (what Feres provides) uniform
nonrecovery.' 10 3 Justice Scalia classified the Veterans' Benefits Act
(VBA) as an "upper limit on the Government's liability" and stated it is
not really the exclusive remedy when those who are permitted to
recover under the FTCA still receive compensation from the VBA. 0 4
Therefore, "the VBA is not, as Feres assumed, identical to federal and
state workers' compensation statutes in which exclusivity provisions
almost invariably appear."' 0 5 Also, due to the fact that this case was
brought against a Federal civilian employee rather than another mili-
tary member, Justice Scalia did not believe that military discipline
would be undermined and there should not be any concern that civil-
ian courts would be required to second-guess military decisions. 10 6
He also noted that in many cases, civilians who bring suits based on
the military's negligence conduct the same inquiry into military deci-
sion making, and the issue of the military discipline rationale is never
contemplated.' 07
99. United States v. Johnson, 481 U.S. 681 (1987) (Widow of deceased Coast
Guard helicopter pilot brought wrongful death action against the United States when
he received negligent instructions from a civilian Federal Government employee).
100. Id.; Shearer v. United States, 473 U.S. 52 (1985).
101. Johnson, 481 U.S. at 700.
102. Id. at 695 (referring to Rayonier, Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S. 315, 319
(1957); Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 66-69 (1955)).
103. Id. at 695-96.
104. Id. at 698.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. In Scalia's dissent he noted that "[i]f Johnson's helicopter had crashed into a
civilian's home, the homeowner could have brought an FTCA suit that would have
invaded the sanctity of the military decision-making no less than respondents."
Johnson, 481 U.S. at 700.
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Many judges support Scalia's dissent and reluctantly follow Feres.
As long as there is a loose fit between the facts of the cases and the
military discipline rationale that justifies the Feres bar,1 °8 judges will
continue to struggle to support the Supreme Court. As judges analyze
the cases, they rely on the military discipline rationale of the Feres
doctrine as a disclaimer for their reluctant enforcement of the Feres
bar.10 9 If they instead focused on the military entitlements the service
member will receive, courts may conclude that even though the gov-
ernment is often negligent, the service member will be compensated in
some form.
If the Supreme Court had maintained its position that service
members could not recover because the government already provides
compensation, lower courts might express more support for the Feres
doctrine. Perhaps some of the most compelling reasons soldiers
should not recover further under the FTCA are that all service mem-
bers have a $250,000 life insurance policy called SGLI, and they
receive free medical and health care benefits, veterans benefits, and
disability benefits. Instead of relying on these reasons, the courts
apply the military discipline rationale to many fact situations where it
does not justify the reason for the bar when the alternative compensa-
tory scheme reasoning would.
For instance, in Richards v. United States, the Third Circuit reluc-
tantly determined that a soldier killed on base by a military truck
while driving home occurred incident to service." 0  The judges
reached this conclusion by applying the Feres factors, i.e., looking at
the service member's duty status, the site of the accident, and the
nature of the member's activity at the time of the injury, while consid-
ering each of the factors in light of the totality of the circumstances."'
The court also referred to case precedents in similar fact situations and
noted if the soldier had been half a mile off post or on furlough at the
time of the accident, other case precedents would permit recovery." 2
The court noted that Richards "would not, except in the event of the
rarest coincidence, have been in the same place at the same time with
the same purpose, had it not been incident to his active status in the
108. Richards v. United States, 176 F.3d 652 (3d Cir. 1999).
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Richards, 176 F.3d at 656 (referring to Troglia v. United States, 602 F.2d 1334
(9th Cir. 1979), where the accident took place one-half mile outside the base, and
Brooks v. United States, 337 U.S. 49 (1949), where two service members on furlough
and on a public highway were determined to be on personal business).
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military."' 1 3 The judge writing the majority opinion disapproved of
the Feres bar because a civilian would be entitled to recover if a civilian
had been hit by that military truck. 114 The court then attempted to
undermine the ruling, by relying on the military discipline ratio-
nale. 1 5 The judge pointed out that an investigation into military
affairs would occur and questions would be raised concerning military
negligence and supervision, even when a civilian was involved in the
accident." 16 But the court failed to note the most relevant fact: that the
civilian is not going to receive the benefits to which a service member
is entitled.
The court bluntly stated its opinion of the Feres doctrine in the
final statements of the opinion: "we are left with a counter-intuitive and
inequitable result simply because of Private Richards's military status.
It is because Feres too often produces such curious results that mem-
bers of this court repeatedly have expressed misgivings about it."11 7
This court should not have been regretful for correctly concluding that
the sole reason the Feres Bar applies rests upon the claimant's military
status. After all of the court's philosophical debate, the simple fact
that a person is on active duty status and eligible for compensatory
benefits should alone be enough to enforce the Feres Bar. If this court
was fully aware of the SGLI survivors' benefits, they may have been
more confident that they made the right decision and in the light of
fairness, the victim's survivor received compensation for the loss.
Costo v. United States" 8 is another case where the court resisted
the rationale of the Feres doctrine, but upheld the bar based on case
precedent. In this case, two sailors drowned on a rafting trip adminis-
tered by the Morale Welfare and Recreation (MWR) program provided
by the military. 119 Cases consistently rule that recreational activities
sponsored by the military fall within the Feres doctrine because the
equipment and programs constitute a privilege incident to service
which servicemen otherwise would not have access to."'2 After apply-
ing the incident to service factors and comparing the case to facts of
113. Richards, 176 F.3d at 656.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 657.
118. Costo v. United States, 248 F.3d 863 (9th Cir. 2001).
119. Id.
120. See Pringle v. United States, 208 F.3d 1220 (10th Cir. 2000) (held that
recreational activities sponsored by the military fall within the Feres doctrine).
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similar cases, the court felt its only choice was to enforce the Feres
bar.121 The Ninth Circuit stated:
[W]e apply the Feres doctrine here without relish. Nor are we the first
to reluctantly reach such a conclusion under the doctrine. Rather, in
determining this suit to be barred, we join the many panels of this
Court that have criticized the inequitable extension of this doctrine to
a range of situations that seem far removed from the doctrine's original
purposes. But until Congress, the Supreme Court, or an en banc panel
of this Court reorients the doctrine, we are bound to follow this well-
worn path.1
22
The dissent in Costo adamantly attacked the Feres doctrine as a
violation of service members' constitutional rights under the Four-
teenth and Fifth Amendments and the constitutional separation of
powers. 123 In his dissent, Judge Ferguson felt that the Federal Tort
Claims Act was designed "to place all Americans on an equal footing in
litigating the civil liability of the federal government for claims of tort
injuries."' 24 He criticized the interpretation of the FTCA and noted
that "[it is not for 'the judiciary [to] sit as a superlegislature to judge
the wisdom or desirability of legislative policy determinations made in
areas that neither affect fundamental rights nor proceed along suspect
lines.'1 25 While all Americans are equal, the judge failed to acknowl-
edge that service members waive many of their rights and are treated
differently in several aspects because they receive special benefits that
eliminate the need for additional compensation under the FTCA.
As Judge Ferguson attacked each rationale of the Feres doctrine,
when he approached the topic of compensatory measures already
available to service members he simply restated a point made by Jus-
tice Scalia: " 'both before and after Feres [the Court] permitted injured
servicemen to bring FTCA suits, even though they had been compen-
sated under the [Veterans Benefit Act]. '""126 He acknowledged that the
problem the courts found with the compensation already available to
military members was that it was not the exclusive remedy.127 This
analysis should have gone a step further to realize the Feres bar does
not need to be removed-the real problem is a compensation scheme
that allows some individuals double recovery.
121. Costo, 248 F.3d at 863 (9th Cir. 2001).
122. Id. at 869 (citations omitted).
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 870 (quoting City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976)).
126. Id. at 875.
127. Id.
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The negative message the lower courts send tends to neglect the
fact that injured service members receive compensation from the gov-
ernment as a benefit to their service. The original Feres case perfectly
demonstrated this fact. The Feres court found:
[the] primary purpose of the [Federal Tort Claims] Act was to extend a
remedy to those who had been without; if it incidentally benefited
those already well provided for, it appears to have been unintentional.
Congress was suffering from no plague of private bills on behalf of
military and naval personnel, because a comprehensive system of relief
had been authorized for them and their dependents by statute.128
The Court also outlined the benefits claimants receive through the
established administrative compensation systems: "The compensation
system, which normally requires no litigation, is not negligible or nig-
gardly, as these cases demonstrate. The recoveries compare extremely
favorably with those provided by most workman's compensation
statutes."
129
The Feres court conducted a cost comparison for each of the
injured servicemen which illustrated the compensation systems in
place for service members in 1950 actually provided better benefits
than State laws would have permitted for recovery. 130 For example,
"[i]n the Jefferson case, the District Court considered actual and pro-
spective payments by the Veterans' Administration as diminution of
the verdict. Plaintiff received $3,645.50 to the date of the court's com-
putation and on estimated life expectancy under existing legislation
would prospectively receive $31,947 in addition."13 1 The Feres court
also noted:
[iun the Griggs case, the widow, in the two-year period after her hus-
band's death, received payments in excess of $2,100. In addition she
received $2,695, representing the six months' death gratuity under the
Act of December 17, 1919 .... It is estimated that her total future
pension payments will aggregate $18,000. Thus the widow will receive
an amount in excess of $22,000 from Government gratuities, whereas
she sought and could seek under state law only $15,000, the maxi-
mum permitted by Illinois for death.
132
If courts today would continue to quantify the dollar amounts ser-
vice members and their survivors receive through benefits, lower
courts would not feel they have committed such a grave injustice every
128. Feres, 340 U.S. at 140.
129. Id. at 145.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 145.
132. Id.
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time they enforce the Feres bar. The judges beg for the Supreme Court
and Congress to reconsider the Feres doctrine but fail to offer a remedy
or consider alternatives. 133 The courts ignore the compensation sys-
tems in place and the enormous cost that would be passed along to
taxpayers if the Feres bar was lifted.
Service members are entitled to several benefits as a result of their
military service. Courts need to become more familiar with the stat-
utes governing the Veterans Administration benefits, disability com-
pensation, life insurance (SGLI), and survivor benefits. Also, it has
been suggested:
the availability of guaranteed military medical care and the benefits
available from the Physical Evaluation Board (PEB) process for "inci-
dent to service" injuries [which determines if a service member is eligi-
ble for disability benefits] is crucial to understanding the breadth of
the compensation scheme available to all active duty service members,
and such a discussion should be included in the litigation report for
any claim of injury.1 3 4
Congress created the Military Claims Act (MCA) to allow military
members to recover for property damage just as civilians recover under
the Federal Tort Claims Act.13 5 Service members are compensated
under the MCA for claims arising out of non-combat activities (train-
ing) or claims brought by soldiers for property losses sustained inci-
dent to their service within the United States. 136 This allows service
members to receive a monetary settlement when a government
employee negligently causes damage to a service member's property
while acting within the scope of his/her employment. 13 7 Therefore, if a
government vehicle causes damage to a service member's privately
owned car, the government will award the same settlement to a mili-
tary member under the MCA that a civilian would receive under the
FTCA. Also, whenever a service member's household goods are dam-
aged during relocation, the government will reimburse the claimant for
the replacement value. The fact Congress separately devised the Mili-
tary Claims Act to ensure service members received compensation for
their private property indicates a legislative intent to specifically
133. Costo v. United States, 248 F.3d 863 (9th Cir. 2001); O'Neill v. United States,
140 F.3d 564 (3d Cir. 1998); Elliot By and Through Elliot v. United States, 13 F.3d
1555 (11th Cir. 1994).
134. Major Boucher, Feres Cases Need Investigation, Too. Army Lawyer, July 1997, at
45.
135. U.S. Department of the Army, Regulation 27-30, Claims (31 Dec 1997)
[hereinafter AR-27].
136. AR-27, Claims, Section 2-18, Determination of correct statute, (31 Dec 97).
137. AR 27-20, Chapter 3.
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address the extent of tort liability for service members. The fact they
do not include recovery for personal injury under the MCA is most
likely because service members receive alternative compensation
through military benefits and statutory entitlements.
The fairness of the Feres doctrine lies in the fact that the military
benefits are similar to a workers' compensation plan which limits the
government's liability. The service members have statutory remedies
and therefore should not be entitled to double recovery under the Fed-
eral Tort Claims Act. While it is of the utmost importance to protect
service members' rights, it is also significant that taxpayers fund the
compensatory systems already in place for military personnel. It
would be an injustice to raise taxes so service members could also
seek damages in a court room for injuries sustained incident to ser-
vice. If the benefits are inadequate, it should be the plaintiff service
member's responsibility to justify why taxpayers should pay additional
monies. This approach would pinpoint weaknesses in the compensa-
tory systems, and the courts could then prove statutory entitlements
are inadequate and send a clear message to Congress to take action.
In 1950, the Supreme Court recognized if the creation of the Feres
Doctrine and interpretation of the FTCA was incorrect, then "Con-
gress, as author of the confusion, [will be assigned] the task of qualify-
ing and clarifying its language ... 138 Congressional silence for fifty
years should indicate that legislators do not object to the Feres doctrine
prohibiting service members from recovering for injuries incident to
service.
If Congress were to respond to the judicial branch's pleas, it
should create a better system that resembles a workers' compensation
scheme comparable to those of private companies rather than lift the
Feres bar. The legislation in reference to service member recovery
should improve the systems already in place and possibly limit the ben-
efits for those service members who suffer injuries that are not within
the definition of "incident to service" and therefore entitled to recover
under the Federal Tort Claims Act.
In a Congressional Hearing on July 31, 2001, a compromise was
proposed which would allow members of the Armed Forces to sue the
United States for damages for certain injuries caused by improper
medical care. 139 This pending legislation suggests:
138. Feres, 340 U.S. at 138.
139. To amend chapter 171 of title 28, United States Code, to allow members of the
Armed Forces to sue the United States for damages for certain injuries caused by improper
medical care: Hearing on H.R. 2684 Before the Committee on the Judiciary, 107th Cong.
(2001) (Statement by Mr. Frank).
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[P]ayment of any claim of a member of the Armed Forces under this
section shall be reduced by the present value of other benefits received
by the member and the member's estate, survivors, and beneficiaries
under Title X, Title XXXVII, or Title XXXVIII that are attributable to the
physical injury or death from which the claim arose. 1 40
This provision would prevent overcompensation by suggesting that
recovery under the FTCA be reduced by the value of the benefits ser-
vice members already receive.
The Feres bar serves a fiscal function, keeping taxes down by lim-
iting government liability. It is highly unlikely in today's economy that
legislators who want to get re-elected will take any steps towards reach-
ing further into their constituents' pockets. Improvements to the cur-
rent compensatory system would be far less costly than opening the
floodgate of litigation and damages that would result if service mem-
bers were entitled to recover under the FTCA. In time, as recruiting
and retention will remain hot issues in our voluntary military, the ben-
efits entitled to service members will remain in effect. Therefore, as
suggested by the recent Congressional hearings, if the FTCA were to
allow service members to recover damages, Congress would likely
reduce the damages by the value of benefits received.
If Congress revises the FTCA or if the Supreme Court overrules
the Feres doctrine, many courts may still find reasons to bar claims. In
Bruneau v. United States, a Massachusetts federal district court found
that even though the government may have been negligent during Air
Force training, and serviceman Bruneau's injuries were significant, the
discretionary function exception barred his claim.' 41 The court found
that "[tihe decisions of the Air Force that allegedly caused plaintiffs
injuries allowed room for the exercise of discretion, and were suscepti-
ble to policy-related analysis. They therefore [met] the requirements of
the discretionary function exception and bar[red] his claim."'1 42 The
discretionary exception provides sovereign immunity for decisions
made by government employees, but holds the U.S. Government liable
for those acts negligently carried out.'4 3 Therefore, many of the mili-
tary decisions would be protected, but the government would be
responsible every time a service member failed to exercise due care.
Another option recently exercised by a court was to find the suit
non-justiciable. 14 4 When faced with a death due to Army National
140. Id.
141. Bruneau v. United States, 151 F.Supp.2d 303 (D. Mass 2001).
142. Id. at 305.
143. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (2001).
144. Estate of Burris v. State, 759 A.2d 802 (Md. 2000).
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Guard members negligently operating a truck during a summer train-
ing exercise, a Maryland court chose not to apply the Feres doctrine.145
Instead, the court found that the non-justiciability doctrine precluded
judicial determination of whether the National Guard was liable. The
court stated:
The non-justiciability doctrine is based on the notion that certain pol-
icy issues relating to military provisioning, duty assignments, and
training are ordinarily matters committed to the Legislative and Execu-
tive Branches and, at least in the absence of a Constitutional authoriza-
tion by them, may not be interfered with by judges and juries. 146
Courts have traditionally applied great deference to military matters
and may substitute the Feres bar with the non-justiciable doctrine as a
broader approach to apply regardless of the claimant's military or civil-
ian status and avoid cases that are sensitive to military matters.' 4 7
Even courts that complain about applying the Feres bar to the
facts in particular cases support the Feres doctrine's military discipline
rationale in a narrow set of circumstances. For example, in Richards v.
United States, the Third Circuit stated:
One can imagine a hypothetical scenario in which the conduct or deci-
sions of a service member's superiors necessarily would come under
scrutiny during the course of a putative lawsuit. Imagine, for instance,
a case in which a soldier attempted to sue the commander of his pla-
toon for injuries received during battle. Such a suit clearly would
involve injuries that "ar[o]se out of or in the course of activity incident
to military service.". . . Therefore, this suit would implicate the 'special
relationship' between the soldier and his superior that is contemplated
in Shearer... and Muniz.... No court would have difficulty in finding
that Feres barred such a suit because the fit between the facts of the
case and the rationales justifying Feres would be close.' 4 8
Those courts seeking reform to the FTCA feel the need to limit its
application because of the military discipline rationale. While the
need to avoid interfering with military decisions may provide a valid
reason to support the Feres doctrine, courts should look back to all of
the original rationales and remember the military discipline rationale
is not the only justification for its application.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 814.
147. Id.
148. Richards v. United States, 176 F.3d 652, 657 (3d Cir. 1999).
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VI. CONCLUSION
The Feres bar is a valid defense to bar claims for service members
who already receive compensation from other Governmental sources.
The lower courts continue to struggle with the Feres doctrine because
the military discipline rationale does not seem to support the interest
of fairness in several situations. It is time for the Supreme Court to
step in and stop the lower courts' inconsistent rulings by reinstating
the original alternative compensatory benefits rationale of the Feres
doctrine and by establishing a better framework for analysis. The
Court should focus on the fiscal function the Feres bar supplies and
should create a test that weighs the loss incurred versus the benefits
the service member will receive. If courts consistently find the remedy
the Government provides to be inadequate, then claimants should cry
out to Congress with their problems regarding the statutory compensa-
tory systems presently in place.
Kelly L. Dill
[Vol. 24:71
22
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 24, Iss. 1 [2001], Art. 4
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol24/iss1/4
